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A Corrigendum on
Is There a Conjunction Fallacy in Legal Probabilistic Making?
by Wojciechowski, B. W., and Pothos, E. M. (2018). Front. Psychol. 9:391.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00391
In the original article, there was an error.
In the Discussion section, a small error was made in one of the quantum computations, which
requires minor adjustment of the discussion. None of the empirical results, analyses, and other
conclusions are affected.
A correction has been made to Discussion, paragraph 7. The original sentence was: For a double
CF, we have: Prob(A), Prob(B)>Prob(A&B), that is a CF occurs for both conjuncts. This has been
corrected to: For a double CF, we have: Prob(A), Prob(B)<Prob(A&B), that is a CF occurs for both
conjuncts.
A correction has been made to Discussion, paragraph 8. The original sentence was: For the
participants with no legal background, we have a situation where Prob(A), Prob(B)>Prob(A&B),
for when evaluating criminal cases for which the suspect was guilty for both crimes. This has been
corrected to: For the participants with no legal background, we have a situation where Prob(A),
Prob(B)<Prob(A&B), for when evaluating criminal cases for which the suspect was guilty for both
crimes.
A correction has been made to Discussion, paragraph 10. The original sentences were: The
observed results require an initial representation for the mental space in a tensor product structure
as above, but also a thought process which “mixes” thoughts and beliefs between the two crimes
(Pothos and Busemeyer, 2009; Broekaert et al., 2017). It is not our purpose presently to outline in
detail a full cognitive model for the consideration of criminal cases and we focus on the technical
elements of QPT that allow for coverage of the results (for more relevant details see e.g., Pothos
and Busemeyer, 2009; Trueblood and Busemeyer, 2011; Pothos et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2013;
Narens, 2014). This has been corrected to: The observed results motivate the consideration of an
initial representation for the mental space in a tensor product structure as above, but also a thought
process which “mixes” thoughts and beliefs between the two crimes (Pothos and Busemeyer, 2009;
Broekaert et al., 2017). It is not our purpose presently to outline in detail a full cognitive model
for the consideration of criminal cases and we focus on the technical elements of QPT potentially
relevant for coverage of the results (for more relevant details see Pothos and Busemeyer, 2009;
Trueblood and Busemeyer, 2011; Pothos et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2013; Narens, 2014).
Wojciechowski and Pothos The Conjunction Fallacy in Legal Decision Making
A correction has been made to Discussion, paragraph 11, |a−
c|2 has been replaced by |a|2+|c|2, and |a−b|2 has been replaced
by |a|2 + |b|2. A sentence has also been added, the corrected
paragraph appears below.
Prob
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Prob
(
Crime1yes&Crime2yes;ψ
)
= |a|2
Recall that a mental state vector in QPT is normalized, therefore
|a|2 + |b|2 + |c|2 + |d|2 = 1. But it should be clear that this
scheme still cannot accommodate a CF, which illustrates that only
certain space structures can produce a single CF (e.g., as in Pothos
and Busemeyer, 2009) and it is unclear whether a double CF is
possible at all.
A correction has been made the Discussion, paragraph 12. A
sentence was added, the corrected paragraphs appear below.
Overall, the present results revealed a double CF, for lay
(regarding legal knowledge) individuals, but not for participants
with more advanced levels of legal knowledge/experience with
legal proceedings. As an empirical finding, this constitutes a
salutary message regarding the ability of humans to embody
rational decision making, in situations where there is a high
expectation for such decision making. The double CF presents
a challenge for decision models specifically developed to account
for the CF and related fallacies. We focussed on one model, based
on QPT. So far, QPT theory for the CF has been applied to the
single CF, which is by far the most common finding. Modeling of
the single CF with QPT involves incompatible questions, which
lead to a psychological explanation based on how one question
alters our perspective for the other. Regarding the double CF,
we have outlined one possibility based on QPT, corresponding
to compatible questions, and a “mixing” thought process; our
outline was intended to simply show indicative calculations,
noting that for a single CF only particular space structures will
work.
Psychologically this corresponds to a consideration of
the two questions in a way that thoughts making each
one individually more likely interfere with each other in
the conjunctive case to produce probabilities inconsistent
with CPT.
The authors apologize for this error and state that this does
not change the scientific conclusions of the article in any way.
The original article has been updated.
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